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MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY AUTHORIZATION UNDER 
CHAPTER 9: A CALL FOR UNIFORMITY AMONG STATES 
It is undeniable . . . that Chapter 9 is no longer of interest only to 
bankruptcy lawyers. As elected officials, county and municipal managers, 
budget officials, bond lawyers, financial advisors and capital markets address 
the problems now before them, and hopefully the plans for a prosperous future, 
all such participants should become increasingly knowledgeable of what can 
and cannot be accomplished in Chapter 9.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Could a municipality of this state file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9? If 
so, how would the bankruptcy process affect future borrowing costs and the 
value of the municipality’s outstanding bonds? Would there be notable effects 
on the bond market as a whole? These questions, often posed to public finance 
attorneys, are increasingly relevant in light of the recent economic recession in 
the United States. Macroeconomic instability often trickles down to the local 
level, and municipal defaults have been shown to follow downturns in business 
cycles.2 
Key factors for defaults include fluctuating land values, booms and busts 
in commodities, and improbable projections of the future.3 From a more 
analytical perspective, municipalities struggle to raise revenue in times of 
financial distress.4 This is due in part to diminishing property tax values, high 
unemployment, and declining manufacturing and construction activity, each 
resulting in decreased tax revenues for a city.5 Meanwhile, on the expense side, 
these same economic factors increase the per capita costs of operating a 
government.6 Finally, unexpected one-time expenses often arise in 
recessionary periods, creating fiscal challenges for municipalities that are 
 
 1. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: A GUIDE FOR PUBLIC 
FINANCE ATTORNEYS 103 (2011), available at http://www.nabl.org/uploads/cms/documents/mu 
nicipal_bankruptcy_a_guide_for_public_finance_attorneys.pdf. 
 2. Cate Long, Would the real default rate stand up?, THOMSON REUTERS, Apr. 19, 2011, 
http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2011/04/19/would-the-real-default-rate-stand-up/. 
 3. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 5. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 6. 
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unable to quickly raise revenue.7 Such expenses include those that follow from 
failed projects, legal judgments against the city, and environmental 
remediation obligations.8 
When a municipality finds itself in financial peril due to these economic 
hardships, it may consider Chapter 9 bankruptcy its most efficient solution. 
Perhaps the most recent and noteworthy example is the City of Detroit filing 
for municipal bankruptcy on July 18, 20139 in what Michigan Governor 
Richard Snyder deemed “the only reasonable alternative . . . available.”10 
Detroit’s filing marked the largest municipal bankruptcy since the creation of 
the Chapter 9 law in 1938,11 with an estimated $18 billion in outstanding 
debt.12 Many of the city’s financial difficulties correspond to those outlined 
above. Specifically, Detroit’s unemployment rate has almost tripled since 
2000, its roughly 78,000 abandoned structures reflect a lack of manufacturing 
and construction activity, and Governor Snyder attributed the city’s inability to 
meet creditor obligations to “a decreasing tax base.”13 
This comment will first consider a municipality’s ability to utilize the 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy law. Particular emphasis will be given to Tenth 
Amendment limitations and the statutory eligibility requirements. It will then 
describe notable Chapter 9 legal cases, outline the benefits and ill effects of 
filing for municipal bankruptcy, and analyze the treatment of bonds in Chapter 
9 proceedings. Finally, the comment will argue that states should uniformly 
authorize Chapter 9 bankruptcies—both expressly in their statutes and without 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. What Detroit’s Bankruptcy Means for Muni Bonds, CHARLES SCHWAB ON INVESTING, 
Winter 2013, available at http://www.schwab.com/public/file/P-6479089/On_Investing_Full_ 
PDF.pdf. 
 10. John Bringardner, Detroit Files For Chapter 9, Largest Ever Municipal Bankruptcy, 
FORBES, July 18, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/2013/07/18/detroit-files-for-chap 
ter-9-largest-ever-municipal-bankruptcy/. 
 11. Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 403, 403 (2014). The first municipal debt provisions were actually enacted in 1934 
in response to an estimated 1,000 municipalities defaulting on their bonds during the Great 
Depression. The United States Supreme Court found the legislation unconstitutional for 
infringing on the sovereign powers of the states. Revised legislation was then enacted in 1937 and 
upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Bekins (1938). JAMES E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN 
AND CUTLER LLP, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL DEBT ADJUSTMENT 4–5 (2012), available at 
http://www.afgi.org/resources/Bankruptcy_Primer.pdf. 
 12. Michael Corkery & Matthew Dolan, Detroit Bankruptcy Likely to Spark a Pension 
Brawl: Filing Will be a Test Case of How Far a City Can Go in Shredding Retiree Costs, WALL 
ST. J. (ONLINE), July 19, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873242634045786 
16204128866568. 
 13. Bringardner, supra note 10. 
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limitations or preconditions. This change would help create uniformity, 
promote predictability, and stabilize the municipal bond market. 
II.  TENTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
In accordance with the federal Constitution, Congress holds the power to 
establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United 
States.”14 This authority, however, is limited by the sovereign powers of the 
states.15 In particular, the Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are preserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”16 In enacting 
Chapter 9, Congress was well aware of the risk that broad municipal 
bankruptcy powers could interfere with the right of states to control their 
internal affairs in violation of this amendment.17 After all, a municipality is a 
mere subdivision or instrumentality of the state in which it is located.18 As a 
result, the Bankruptcy Code places significant restraints on the powers of a 
federal bankruptcy court to interfere with the operations of a state-controlled 
municipality in Chapter 9 proceedings.19 
One such restraint can be found in 11 U.S.C. § 904 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.20 This section forbids the bankruptcy court from interfering with a 
Chapter 9 municipality’s ability to use its property, raise taxes, or make 
expenditures without its consent.21 Additionally, the bankruptcy judge is 
restricted from forcing the municipality to sell its assets to satisfy a secured 
creditor’s lien or appointing a trustee to assume management powers over the 
 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 15. Francisco Vazquez, Examining Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy Cases, in CHAPTER 9 
BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING 
PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 173, 
176–77 (2011). 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 17. Vazquez, supra note 15, at 177. 
 18. Peter J. Benvenutti & Joseph M. Witalec, State Law Authorization for a Chapter 9 
Filing, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE 
CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS 
AND CASES 35, 37 (2011). 
 19. Leon R. Barson & Francis J. Lawall, Chapter 9 Bankruptcy: Restructuring 
Municipalities in Financial Distress, in CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING 
LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, 
AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 7, 16–17 (2011). 
 20. John J. Rapisardi et al., Chapter 9: A Big Stick, Rarely Used, in CHAPTER 9 
BANKRUPTCY STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE CHAPTER 9 FILING 
PROCESS, COUNSELING MUNICIPALITIES, AND ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS AND CASES 153, 
157 (2011). 
 21. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2006). 
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municipality.22 Rather, a Chapter 9 municipality retains total control over its 
own operations and affairs.23 It is not required to seek court approval before 
using, leasing, or even selling property outside the ordinary course of 
business.24 Thus a municipality can, in its independent discretion, choose to 
make any transfer or pay any claims, including those arising before the petition 
for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.25 
Consequently, the bankruptcy judge’s involvement is severely limited.26 
His or her primary duties are to determine the filing municipality’s Chapter 9 
eligibility, oversee the handling of executory contracts, and approve or deny 
the proposed plan of adjustment.27 As such, it can be argued that most of the 
court’s role only occurs at the front and back ends of the proceedings.28 
Accordingly, Chapter 9 debtors typically conduct their affairs without 
obtaining any form of prior approval from the bankruptcy court.29 The 
municipalities, therefore, seem to be subjected to far less court oversight than 
their counterparts in the corporate sector—namely Chapter 11 debtors.30 This 
prevents creditors from influencing municipal affairs during Chapter 9 
proceedings or gaining any significant leverage in general.31 
Congress’ recognition of Tenth Amendment concerns in municipal 
bankruptcies has also resulted in strict eligibility requirements for Chapter 9 
relief.32 Although a more in-depth analysis of eligibility will be provided in the 
next section, one requirement in particular is closely linked to the preservation 
of state power. Since state control is protected by the Tenth Amendment and 
consent is necessary for one of its municipalities to file for bankruptcy, 11 
U.S.C. § 109(c) requires specific authorization by the state for Chapter 9 
proceedings to commence.33 The state authorization requirement serves only a 
threshold purpose, as once it and the other eligibility requirements are satisfied, 
Chapter 9 in its entirety applies to the bankruptcy case without restrictions 
from state law.34 As the In re City of Vallejo court explained, the Bankruptcy 
 
 22. Barson & Lawall, supra note 19, at 17. 
 23. Vazquez, supra note 15, at 177. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006) (imposing limitations on use, sale, and lease of property 
by a trustee in bankruptcy). § 901 makes § 363 inapplicable in a Chapter 9 case. Vazquez, supra 
note 15, at 177. 
 26. Barson & Lawall, supra note 19, at 17. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Rapisardi et al., supra note 20, at 157. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Benvenutti & Witalec, supra note 18, at 36–37. 
 33. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006). 
 34. Benvenutti & Witalec, supra note 18, at 37. 
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Code affords states the opportunity to “act as gatekeepers to their 
municipalities’ access to relief” under the code.35 However, once a state 
provides the necessary authorization, it “must accept Chapter 9 in its totality” 
and essentially “declares that the benefits of Chapter 9 are more important than 
state control over its municipalities.”36 
III.  STATUTORY ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY 
Title 11 § 109 of the United States Code sets out the criteria for qualifying 
as a debtor under various chapters of the title.37 Subsection (c) describes which 
entities may constitute debtors for purposes of Chapter 9 and establishes five 
eligibility requirements.38 These are threshold elements that must all be 
satisfied in order to pursue a Chapter 9 bankruptcy.39 Bankruptcy courts are 
tasked with scrutinizing these petitions and thus, over time, have begun to 
adjudicate the meaning and construction of the 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) eligibility 
requirements.40 
First, the debtor must be a municipality.41 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) defines a 
municipality as a “political subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a 
State.”42 A political subdivision typically includes a county, parish, city, town, 
village, borough, or township.43 Meanwhile, a public agency or instrumentality 
generally refers to an entity organized for the purpose of constructing, 
maintaining, and operating revenue-producing enterprises.44 The source of the 
revenue may range from taxes to income-producing property.45 As a result, 
 
 35. In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 36. Id. 
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006). 
 38. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006). 
 39. Seena Foster, Annotation, Eligibility for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Relief, Applicable to 
Municipalities, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c), 57 A.L.R. FED. 2d 121 (2011). 
 40.  Id. 
 41. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2006). 
 42. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2006). 
 43.  See In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 601, 601 n.16 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) 
(noting that “case law offers little guidance” in properly defining “municipality”); see also In re 
N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 265 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that the 
legislative history “does not offer any assistance in determining the scope” of the term). 
 44. See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 795 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (reasoning 
that whether an entity is an instrumentality depends on “the extent to which the entity has 
traditional governmental attributes or engages in traditional governmental functions, the extent to 
which the State controls the entity’s operations, . . . and the extent to which the State itself 
categorizes the entity as a municipality or instrumentality”); see also In re County of Orange, 183 
B.R. at 602–03 (discussing types of entities that qualify as public agencies or instrumentalities of 
the state). 
 45. Vazquez, supra note 15, at 183. 
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hospitals, school districts, and highway authorities are public agencies or 
instrumentalities and may be eligible to qualify as Chapter 9 debtors.46 
The municipality must also demonstrate that it is insolvent.47 Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, insolvency is established if the municipality is either 
generally not paying or entirely unable to pay its debts as they become due.48 
Courts typically analyze a municipality’s insolvency as of the date of the 
Chapter 9 filing to determine its eligibility for Chapter 9 relief.49 The first 
formulation of insolvency would generally not be satisfied upon nonpayment 
of undisputed amounts that a municipality can pay, nonpayment of debts that 
are not due, or nonpayment in bad faith.50 On the other hand, the second 
formulation requires a prospective analysis and a showing of a future inability 
to pay, which often is demonstrated by submitting projections or a budget to 
the court.51 
In addition, only a municipality that “desires to effect a plan to adjust [its] 
debts” may be a debtor under Chapter 9.52  No bright-line test exists for this 
determination, as courts instead apply a subjective test and generally consider 
direct, circumstantial, or other evidence indicative of the municipality’s 
intent.53 If the court concludes that the municipality filed in order to delay or 
evade its creditors, it is not entitled to relief under Chapter 9.54 
Next, the municipality must satisfy one of the four alternatives set forth in 
§ 109(c)(5) by demonstrating that it 
(A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in 
amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a 
plan in a case under such chapter; (B) has negotiated in good faith with 
creditors and has failed to obtain the agreement of creditors holding at least a 
majority in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to 
impair under a plan in a case under such chapter; (C) is unable to negotiate 
with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable; or (D) reasonably 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2006). 
 48. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2006). 
 49. In re Slocum Lake Drainage Dist. of Lake City, 336 B.R. 387, 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2006) (laying out the principle that “[e]ligibility is properly measured at the time the petition is 
filed, not at some later or indeterminable future date”). 
 50. In re Town of Westlake, 211 B.R. 860, 864 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997); In re Hamilton 
Creek Metro. Dist., 143 F.3d 1381, 1385 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 51. In re Pierce Cnty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 710–11 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009). This 
is a cash flow, not a budget deficit, analysis. Id. at 711. 
 52. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (2006). 
 53. In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280, 295 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009). 
 54. Id. 
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believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is avoidable under 
section 547 of this title.55 
Perhaps the most contested eligibility requirement is § 109(c)(2), which 
requires that the municipality be “specifically authorized, in its capacity as a 
municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by 
a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize 
such entity to be a debtor under [Chapter 9].”56 This element demands further 
consideration, as states have yet to reach a consensus on whether or not to 
allow their municipalities to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Moreover, there are 
differing limitations and preconditions among those states that do provide 
authorization. 
IV.  THE STATE AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENT 
Prior to 1994, § 109(c)(2) required only that municipalities be “generally 
authorized” (emphasis added) to file for Chapter 9 relief.57 Most courts 
interpreted this phrase broadly such that the state did not need to expressly 
grant municipalities the power to file.58 Rather, the authority to file could be 
implied from the general powers granted to a municipality by the state.59 
However, other courts refused to imply or infer such power and instead 
mandated express authorization.60 Such inconsistency in the interpretation of 
the law yielded unpredictable results across the country. 
In 1994, Congress responded by amending § 109(c) to replace the 
“generally authorized” language with the phrase, “specifically authorized” 
(emphasis added).61 Scholars and practitioners believe this amendment makes 
clear that, to be effective, the state statute must expressly articulate a 
municipality’s power to file for bankruptcy, as this authority can no longer be 
 
 55. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5) (2006). 
 56. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2006). 
 57. Benvenutti & Witalec, supra note 18, at 38. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.; see also In re Pleasant View Util. Dist. of Chatham Cnty., Tenn., 24 B.R. 632, 638 
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (finding that “the term ‘generally authorized’ as used in § 109(c) 
means only that the state should give some indication that the municipality has the necessary 
power to seek relief under the federal bankruptcy law”). 
 60. Daniel J. Freyberg, Note, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State Authorization to be a 
Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency-And What Will States Do 
Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1997). For example, one court concluded that 
affirmative action from the state was necessary for authorization. In re Carroll Twp. Auth., 119 
B.R. 61, 63 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1990). 
 61. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
222 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV:215 
 
implied from general powers.62 According to the bankruptcy court in In re 
County of Orange, the consensus is that state law must provide authority that is 
“exact, plain, and direct with well-defined limits so that nothing is left to 
inference or implication.”63 Thus far, no court has directly decided whether the 
state authorization statute must specifically reference Chapter 9 or one of its 
predecessors to meet this eligibility requirement.64 
States have failed to reach any type of uniformity in providing the specific 
authorization required for Chapter 9 filings. According to James Spiotto, a 
bankruptcy specialist with the Chicago law firm of Chapman and Cutler LLP, 
fifteen states have laws granting their municipalities the right to file for 
Chapter 9 protection on their own.65 Those states are Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington.66 
While Georgia expressly forbids municipalities from filing for bankruptcy 
under any circumstances, Spiotto explains that the remaining states all want to 
remain in the process in various capacities.67 
Kenneth E. Noble and Kevin M. Baum of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP 
break down the various levels of state authorization differently.68 They find 
that twelve states specifically authorize Chapter 9 filings, while twelve others 
permit bankruptcy filings only after further action is taken by a state, official, 
or other entity.69 Additionally, three other states authorize a limited subset of 
 
 62. Benvenutti & Witalec, supra note 18, at 39. Courts have reached a similar conclusion. In 
re Slocum Lake Drainage Dist. of Lake City, 336 B.R. 387, 390 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) 
(observing that “specific authorization by a state is necessary . . .”). 
 63. In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 604 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 64. Benvenutti & Witalec, supra note 18, at 39. 
 65. John Gramlich, Municipal bankruptcy explained: What it means to file for Chapter 9, 
NEWS HERALD, July 20, 2013, http://www.thenewsherald.com/articles/2013/07/20/news/doc51 
eaf545c13fd728275659.txt?viewmode=fullstory. Chapman and Cutler LLP has focused its 
practice on finance since its founding in 1913 and contains a “Bankruptcy, Restructuring and 
Workouts” practice area consisting of over twenty-five attorneys. CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP, 
http://www.chapman.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2014). 
 66. Gramlich, supra note 65. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Kenneth E. Noble & Kevin M. Baum, Municipal bankruptcies: an overview and recent 
history of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, LEXOLOGY, July 23, 2013, http://www.lexology. 
com/library/detail.aspx?g=c47c30f7-e91f-4398-82f3-f0ce5d2ef704. Katten Muchin Rosenman 
LLP has a renowned “Insolvency and Restructuring” group consisting of over twenty attorneys. 
Insolvency and Restructuring, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, http://www.kattenlaw.com/in 
solvencyandrestructuring#overview (last visited Feb. 19, 2014). 
 69. Noble & Baum, supra note 68. 
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municipalities to file for bankruptcy.70 The remaining twenty-three states do 
not authorize municipal bankruptcy filings.71 
Cory Eucalitto, Kristen De Pena, and Shannan Younger created the 
following map to illustrate each state’s position on authorization as of February 
2013:72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. CORY EUCALITTO ET AL., STATE BUDGET SOLUTIONS, MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: AN 
OVERVIEW FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS 7 (2013), available at http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/ 
doclib/20130301_SBSBankrupcyReport.pdf. 
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A. States Without Necessary Chapter 9 Authorization 
The typology used in the map distinguishes between states prohibiting 
municipalities from filing for bankruptcies and states that merely choose not to 
enact a statute specifically authorizing Chapter 9 filings.73 However, given the 
fact that explicit permission from the state is now believed necessary to satisfy 
the § 109(c)(2) specific authorization requirement,74 the states that are silent on 
municipality bankruptcy effectively prohibit Chapter 9 filings as well. 
Therefore, the two categories can be combined into states that do not permit 
their municipalities to engage in the Chapter 9 process. These states are 
Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.75 
B. States With Limited Chapter 9 Authorization 
Meanwhile, Colorado, Illinois, and Oregon provide specific authorization 
but in a limited manner.76 For example, in Illinois, only municipalities with 
less than 25,000 residents are specifically authorized to file under Chapter 9.77 
However, this authorization is only possible after compliance with a lengthy 
and cumbersome pre-filing process.78 On the other hand, cities with 
populations exceeding 25,000 must utilize the Financially Distressed City Law, 
which provides for a form of receivership proceeding only for “financially 
distressed” cities as labeled by the state.79 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Some scholars, however, argue that despite the shift from “general” to “specific” 
authorization, ambiguity remains as to whether explicit statutory authorization is actually needed 
for municipalities to file. Christopher Smith, Provisions for Access to Chapter 9 Bankruptcy: 
Their Flaws and the Inadequacy of Past Reforms, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 497, 514 (1998). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. David Warfield, Could a Detroit-style bankruptcy happen here?, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., 
Sept. 6, 2013, http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/print-edition/2013/09/06/could-a-detroit-style-
bankruptcy.html?page=all. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Mark Glennon, Bankruptcy is not an option for Illinois cities or other units under 
current law, WIREPOINTS ILL. NEWS, July 29, 2013, http://www.wirepoints.com/dont-count-on-
a-bankruptcy-proceeding-to-fix-illinois-government-at-any-level/. Therefore, due to their size, 
municipalities such as Chicago and Cook County do not have the specific authorization necessary 
for Chapter 9 eligibility. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY AUTHORIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 9 225 
 
C. States With Preconditions to Chapter 9 Filings 
The following states authorize Chapter 9 bankruptcies but impose 
preconditions with which the municipalities must first comply before filing for 
relief: California, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.80 
California provides an excellent illustration of the principle that states serve a 
Chapter 9 gatekeeping function by virtue of the § 109(c)(2) specific 
authorization requirement and corresponding Tenth Amendment 
considerations.81 As the court in In re City of Stockton, Cal. explained, 
California chose to engineer certain parameters of its gate through California 
Government Code § 53760.82 It implemented mandatory preconditions a 
municipality must partake in before receiving authorization to become a 
Chapter 9 debtor.83 In particular, the municipality must first either engage in a 
neutral evaluation process or have a fiscal emergency declared by its governing 
board.84 This principle is also well evidenced by states like Michigan85 and 
Rhode Island,86 among others. 
D. States Providing Unfettered Access to Chapter 9 
The relevant Missouri statute provides a standard example of the specific 
authorization necessary for Chapter 9 filing free from any limitations or 
preconditions: 
The consent of the state is hereby granted to, and all appropriate powers are 
hereby conferred upon, any municipality or political subdivision organized 
under the laws of the state to institute any appropriate action authorized by any 
act of the Congress of the United States relating to bankruptcy on the part of 
any municipality or political subdivision.87 
 
 80. EUCALITTO ET AL., supra note 72, at 7. 
 81. In re City of Stockton, California, 475 B.R. 720, 727 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Before Detroit’s filing in 2013, investors considered Michigan a state that took measures 
for its municipalities to avoid Chapter 9, as multiple requirements were in place before filing a 
petition. KRISTEN DEJONG & BETH DOUGHERTY, NUVEEN ASSET MGMT., MUNICIPAL 
BANKRUPTCY: A PRIMER ON CHAPTER 9, at 2 (2013), available at http://www.nuveen.com/ 
Home/Documents/Viewer.aspx?fileId=48362. 
 86. In May 2010, Rhode Island passed legislation that established the state’s intervention 
role in financially distressed municipalities. A three-stage intervention process is now in place 
before authorization is given for Chapter 9 relief. Id. at 3. 
 87. MO. ANN. STAT. § 427.100 (West 2010). 
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States that offer their municipalities similar unfettered access to Chapter 9 
relief include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington.88 
V.  NOTEWORTHY CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCY CASES 
Although little case law exists in the area of Chapter 9 bankruptcy filings, 
a few notable court decisions illustrate some of the potential issues that may 
arise in a municipality’s attempt to meet the statutory eligibility requirements. 
The cases below address specifically the issue of state authorization. 
In In re County of Orange, the treasurer of Orange County, California 
combined funds into a general investment pool, bond investment pool, and 
specific investment account that collectively filed a Chapter 9 petition.89 The 
court discussed the specific authorization requirement and ultimately 
concluded that it was not satisfied.90 The case was decided in 1995, so this 
bankruptcy court was one of the first to interpret the revised language of § 
109(c)(2).91 The court reasoned: 
Despite the need for specificity, I see no reason why the state authorization can 
not be by specific category. For example, the statute could authorize all 
‘municipalities’ as defined in the Code to file bankruptcy. As previously noted, 
the Code defines municipalities by categories. The state statute could also 
name the specific entities within certain categories. That was the approach 
previously taken in the 1937 Act by § 81. In either case, the authorization 
would appear to be sufficiently specific.92 
In regard to California’s authorization statute, the court noted that it 
specifically referenced § 81, a “laundry list of public entities that are 
authorized to file bankruptcy.”93 Since § 81 did not refer to an investment fund 
or any similar entity, the court found a lack of specific authorization to file for 
Chapter 9 relief.94 
The bankruptcy court in In re New York City Off-Track Betting Corp. 
engaged in a slightly different analysis of the state authorization requirement.95 
The entity that filed for Chapter 9 relief was the New York City Off-Track 
Betting Corporation (NYC OTB).96 NYC OTB was a public-benefit 
 
 88. EUCALITTO ET AL., supra note 72, at 7. 
 89. In re County of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 596 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 90. Id. at 605. 
 91. Id. at 603. 
 92. Id. at 604–05. 
 93. Id. at 605. 
 94. Id. 
 95. In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
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corporation that operated a system of gambling in which bets placed on a race 
were pooled and then paid to those holding winning tickets.97 It was created by 
the New York legislature in 1970 in order to raise revenues for the state and its 
municipalities as well as to combat the presence of organized crime in 
horserace gambling.98 Facing severe financial hardship, NYC OTB filed for 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy in late 2009.99 
The court concluded that NYC OTB had sufficient authorization from New 
York to file for Chapter 9 protection.100 Since the New York legislature had 
not passed a statute explicitly granting NYC OTB the power to file for Chapter 
9 bankruptcy, the court instead looked to the governor’s executive order that 
specifically authorized a filing by the corporation.101 In finding this order 
sufficient for purposes of § 109(c)(2), the court deemed the governor’s 
issuance a direct and unambiguous order explicitly authorizing NYC OTB to 
file for bankruptcy.102 In fact, it held that the executive order followed 
Congress’ instructions precisely, as the statute plainly states that “a 
governmental officer . . . empowered by State law” may specifically authorize 
a municipality.103 
Most recently, a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Michigan 
declared the City of Detroit in compliance with the § 109(c) statutory 
requirements and thus eligible for Chapter 9 protection.104 Michigan is one of 
the twelve states imposing certain preconditions on its municipalities before 
authorizing a filing under Chapter 9. However, in Detroit’s case, the court held 
that the city received the necessary § 109(c)(2) specific authorization through a 
proper governmental officer.105 Namely, Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 263. 
 100. Id. at 271. 
 101. In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. at 267. 
 102. Id. at 267–68. 
 103. Id. at 268. The court further noted that this reading of the statute in no way frustrates 
Congress’s intent to require specific authorization for a municipality to file for Chapter 9 
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municipalities. Id. 
 104. In re City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6331931, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 5, 2013). From the bench, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes stated, “This once 
proud and prosperous city can’t pay its debts. It’s insolvent. It’s eligible for bankruptcy. At the 
same time, it also has an opportunity for a fresh start.” Reid Wilson, Judge declares Detroit 
eligible for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/12/03/judge-declares-detroit-eligible-for-chapter-9-bankruptcy/. 
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issued a written order directing Detroit to file for bankruptcy after obtaining 
approval by the governor.106 
This process was accomplished through Michigan’s Local Financial 
Stability and Choice Act, which allows the governor to declare a state of 
financial emergency and appoint an emergency manager with broad powers, 
including bankruptcy authorization.107 Although this act was previously 
declared unconstitutional by a Michigan state court due to its lack of protection 
of accrued pension benefits, the bankruptcy court reasoned that the impairment 
is expressly permitted during bankruptcy proceedings.108 Therefore, state 
authorization through the act was proper.109 
Now that the city’s Chapter 9 petition is valid, Detroit can partake in the 
potentially lengthy bankruptcy process. The details of the city’s ultimate 
readjustment plan are yet to be determined, but regardless of the outcome, “the 
Detroit case will influence the municipal bond markets and public pension 
industry for years to come.”110 
VI.  ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CHAPTER 9 PROTECTION 
Although the case law demonstrates that issues can arise with any of the 
eligibility requirements, perhaps the most uncertainty lies with the specific 
authorization inquiry given the varying approaches among states. In 
determining whether or not to impose any limitations or preconditions, states 
should consider the advantages and disadvantages of allowing municipalities to 
ultimately partake in Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings. 
From the municipality’s perspective, a key advantage of Chapter 9 is that 
the filing of a bankruptcy petition invokes an automatic stay that remains in 
effect for the duration of the case.111 This is essentially an injunction against 
most actions that could otherwise be taken against the municipality by 
creditors and others.112 Significantly, the automatic stay extends to elected 
officials and all inhabitants of the municipality.113 Thus, even if the 
municipality or other protected persons take or omit actions related to claims 
against the municipality that would otherwise subject them to sanctions or 
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liability, those claims require prior permission from the bankruptcy court in 
order to proceed.114 
Another advantage of Chapter 9 bankruptcy is breathing room for the 
distressed municipality, which is afforded much-needed time to develop and 
negotiate a debt adjustment plan.115 Creditor, labor, and most other disputes are 
all addressed in one forum, and the automatic stay gives the municipality the 
chance to focus on restructuring its outstanding obligations to creditors.116 This 
breathing space is crucial for the municipality, as raising new revenues, 
renegotiating contracts, and restructuring debts are all time-consuming 
endeavors.117 
In addition, municipalities filing under Chapter 9 benefit from limited 
bankruptcy court involvement.118 As previously mentioned, the court cannot 
interfere with the general operations of the local government and does not have 
the power to appoint a trustee to take control of the municipality or call for its 
liquidation.119 Viewed from a different perspective, the municipality benefits 
from access to the bankruptcy judges, who are often experts in financial 
restructuring, negotiations, and complex debtor-creditor and intercreditor 
disputes.120 As one commentator suggests, “the value of a highly qualified and 
experienced judge in helping the stakeholders get to a solution should not be 
underestimated.”121 
A final advantage is the municipality’s ability to adjust its debts and other 
obligations.122 If a plan of adjustment is ultimately confirmed by the 
bankruptcy court in a Chapter 9 case, it may provide that unpaid claims of 
creditors be reduced, extended and restructured, or both.123 Although there are 
numerous limitations to this ability, the plan can provide a fresh start to the 
municipality and allow it to achieve long-term financial stability by deferring 
or reducing past obligations.124 
 
 114. JOHN KNOX & MARC LEVINSON, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, MUNICIPAL 
BANKRUPTCY: AVOIDING AND USING CHAPTER 9 IN TIMES OF FISCAL STRESS 9 (2009), 
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Shifting now to the disadvantages, pursuing a Chapter 9 bankruptcy can be 
extremely costly.125 Legal and financial consulting fees can be steep, and this 
represents money that cannot instead be spent on solving the underlying 
financial problem.126 There is also an opportunity cost involved, as valuable 
staff time is taken away from solving core financial problems and is instead 
directed toward managing and responding to the demands of the bankruptcy 
case itself.127 The distraction of dealing with a Chapter 9 case can severely 
interfere with the staff’s ability to keep the municipality functioning.128 
There is also a social cost to filing—the stigma attached to bankruptcy for 
both the municipality and its residents.129 The stigma may harm the self-esteem 
of the citizens and have an adverse impact on the overall business climate in 
the community.130 New businesses may be reluctant to relocate to the 
municipality, real estate sales may fall, and general economic conditions in the 
area may falter.131 This stigma could linger long after the municipality emerges 
from bankruptcy.132 
Thus far, few municipalities have filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy and had 
their cases reach litigation.133 Therefore, there is little precedent on the 
behavior of judges in a municipal bankruptcy.134 As one commentator warns, 
“[m]unicipalities that file [under Chapter 9] may be exposing themselves to 
risks from adverse judicial decisions.”135 As discussed earlier, adjustment plans 
must be confirmed by the court as well. 
Finally, a major disadvantage to filing for a Chapter 9 bankruptcy is the 
reaction of credit markets.136 Municipalities seeking bankruptcy relief should 
expect a negative effect on their credit ratings, at least in the short term.137 The 
credit stigma may last for years, especially if bondholders are not repaid in 
full.138 Intense scrutiny from the municipality’s creditors and rating agencies 
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should also be expected.139 It is recommended that the municipality provide 
timely and transparent information about its financial condition in order to best 
position itself to restore its credit ratings going forward.140 
VII.  MUNICIPAL BOND TREATMENT IN CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCIES 
States should also consider how municipal bonds are treated in 
bankruptcies when deciding on limitations or preconditions to Chapter 9 
access. 
Municipalities commonly issue two types of municipal bonds—general 
obligation bonds and special revenue bonds.141 It is important to address the 
differences between these two types because they are treated differently under 
Chapter 9 bankruptcies.142 General obligation bonds are generally paid from 
tax revenues and are backed by the full faith, credit, and resources of the 
issuing municipality.143 In other words, the bonds are to be repaid by the 
general taxing power of the municipality and therefore are based on its overall 
financial strength.144 On the other hand, a special revenue bond is typically 
repaid solely from revenues generated by the project or system from which the 
revenues are derived.145 For example, a special revenue bondholder whose 
funds are used to finance a toll road might be repaid only from the finances 
collected by that toll. Essentially, the revenue sources are pledged as security 
for the payment of the bonds.146 
Due to their full faith and credit backing, general obligation municipal 
bonds are typically considered one of the safest categories of investments, 
second only to securities issued by the United States federal government.147 
However, recent treatment of general obligation bonds in Chapter 9 
proceedings threatens to jeopardize this principle. 
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Historically, both types of bonds were treated equally in municipal 
bankruptcies.148 However, in 1998, Congress passed “An Act to Amend the 
Bankruptcy Law to Provide Special Revenue Bonds and for Other 
Purposes.”149 The amendments favor special revenue bonds, as they were 
designed to guarantee that municipalities maintain open access to capital 
markets by ensuring that dedicated revenues would not be diverted if 
bankruptcy occurred.150 In other words, the amendments ensure that pledged 
special revenue bonds cannot be used for the general obligations of a 
municipality.151 Rather, under Chapter 9, these bonds retain their lien on the 
revenue generated by the project and payments are not interrupted by any 
automatic stay during bankruptcy.152 Although these protections make special 
revenue bonds relatively safe, it is important to remember that the bondholders 
usually have no remedy against the municipality if the project revenues are 
insufficient to repay the bond debt owed.153 
Meanwhile, the typically safer general obligation bonds are treated less 
favorably under Chapter 9 proceedings.154 Most of these bonds lack a specific, 
dedicated revenue source.155 Therefore, when bankruptcy is filed, a court may 
treat general obligation bonds without a statutory lien as unsecured debt and 
force their restructuring.156 Payment on the bonds during bankruptcy is likely 
to cease.157 
Despite general obligation bond treatment as unsecured debt in Chapter 9, 
in practice bankrupt debtors have treated these bonds in a variety of ways with 
little consistency.158 For example, Orange County, California continued 
making its debt service payments on general obligation bonds during its 
bankruptcy in 1994.159 Although the payments were not required under 
Chapter 9, Orange County fulfilled its obligations regardless and ultimately 
paid back the bonds in full in order to stand by its original pledge of full faith 
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and credit.160 Similarly, when Central Falls, Rhode Island filed for bankruptcy 
in 2011, the city continued to pay debt service on its general obligation bonds 
due to a new state law making payments to bondholders a priority when in 
financial distress.161 Other municipalities, however, decide to contravene their 
full faith and credit promise and instead take advantage of Chapter 9’s 
automatic stay allowance by defaulting on their general obligation bonds.162 A 
recent example is Jefferson County, Alabama in 2011.163 
With fiscal problems mounting and tax revenues falling, municipal 
bondholders need to be aware of how Chapter 9 bankruptcies can substantially 
affect their investments. A municipality often possesses the power to 
reorganize its debts by reducing principal, extending maturity debts, or entirely 
refinancing the debt.164 As part of the bankruptcy process, the municipality 
submits a reorganization plan to the court for approval, and these plans can 
directly modify its contractual obligations to general obligation bondholders.165 
Thus far, case law has established the principle that under Chapter 9, general 
obligation bonds do not need to be paid in full for a bankruptcy court to 
approve the municipality’s restructuring plan.166 As one court put it, “if a 
municipality were required to pay prepetition bondholders the full amount of 
their claim with interest . . . and the [debtor] had no ability to impair the 
bondholder claims over objection, the whole purpose of Chapter 9 would be of 
little value.”167 
Research undertaken by Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) provides 
concrete numbers in terms of returns on general obligation bonds from Chapter 
9 municipalities. Since 1970, the average recovery for defaulted municipal 
bonds is nearly eighty cents on the dollar.168 Of course, filing for bankruptcy 
does not necessarily make defaults inevitable. Moody’s also estimates that 
bondholders could recover merely 50% of their investments in the Detroit 
bankruptcy case.169 This return threatened to be even smaller before Detroit 
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filed for bankruptcy, as Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr proposed paying back 
just 10% of the city’s debt back in June 2013.170 Now, Detroit’s restructuring 
plan entails higher recoveries for bondholders at the expense of pension 
cuts.171 
In Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the bankruptcy proposal refunds 60–70% of 
total defaulted principal for general obligation bonds.172 However, Moody’s 
notes that ultimate recoveries may be higher if the plan for additional future 
revenues for creditors is successful, while an ability to execute the plan could 
reduce recoveries.173 The variation in returns is also evidenced by Stockton, 
California’s recent Chapter 9 proposal. There, recovery rates vary between 1% 
and 100% for bondholders, with its largest creditor slated to recover only 50% 
of its original investment.174 
VIII.  CALL FOR UNIFORMITY AMONG STATES 
Twenty-seven states currently fall into one of the three categories that 
allow municipalities some form of access to bankruptcy relief—”States With 
Limited Chapter 9 Authorization,” “States With Preconditions to Chapter 9 
Filings,” and “States Providing Unfettered Access to Chapter 9.” This section 
will argue that direct statutory authorization, devoid of limitations or 
preconditions, best aligns with the goals of uniformity, predictability, and a 
favorable municipal bond market. The twenty-seven authorizing states and the 
states that de-authorize or remain silent, therefore, should provide unfettered 
access to Chapter 9. 
Limitations and preconditions afford states autonomy in choosing the steps 
they desire their municipalities to take when facing financial adversity. This 
autonomy beneficially accounts for the different characteristics and ideals of 
each state, particularly in comparison to the unfettered authorization approach. 
However, the state autonomy does not account for differences between 
municipalities within a state. In other words, the Chapter 9 limitations and 
preconditions imposed by a state may represent a strong solution for one of its 
municipalities but may be an ill-advised approach for another. 
Local municipalities inherently understand their financial situation and 
possible need for Chapter 9 relief more so than states, which often consist of 
thousands of local governments. For example, in Illinois, it is hard to imagine 
that any one of the state-imposed limitations or preconditions is truly in the 
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best interest of all 6,963 of its municipalities.175 To the contrary, many states 
mandate preconditions that can be extremely damaging to certain 
municipalities’ attempts at fiscal recovery. Complying with preconditions can 
be incredibly time-consuming. Not only is time crucial to municipalities in 
periods of financial distress, but this also represents time that could instead be 
dedicated to Chapter 9 proceedings and a corresponding readjustment plan. 
Preconditions can also be costly for municipalities already in financial peril, 
and these expenses become entirely futile if the municipality ultimately ends 
up proceeding with Chapter 9 regardless. In fact, states requiring excessive 
preconditions functionally disallow Chapter 9 access altogether. Meanwhile, 
unfettered state authorization would support municipality autonomy and avoid 
many of these time and financial costs. 
The local autonomy argument also ties into the principle that unfettered 
Chapter 9 access is the superior authorization category from a fairness 
perspective. As one commentator notes, “individuals and corporations can file 
for bankruptcy by simply signing a few papers and paying the filing fee.”176 In 
this sense, the United States appears to consider access to bankruptcy relief a 
fair and fundamental privilege for financially struggling individuals and 
entities. Why, then, should municipalities be subject to preconditions and 
limitations before being afforded the chance to benefit from a fresh start in 
bankruptcy? 
In terms of fairness, the previously discussed Illinois limitation seems 
inherently discriminatory, as it grants and denies § 109(c)(2) specific 
authorization on the sole basis of population. Is it fair to enact such a limitation 
that denies certain municipalities access to bankruptcy protection simply 
because of their considerable size? On the other hand, Missouri’s unfettered 
authorization statute provides the bankruptcy access that is contemplated by 
fairness considerations in the United States. Authorizing states should avoid 
implementing preconditions or limitations in response to public and political 
pressures to prevent municipal bankruptcies.177 Only unfettered access to 
Chapter 9 allows municipalities to fairly and autonomously decide whether or 
not to regain their financial stability through bankruptcy. 
It is also worth noting that bankruptcy can be viewed as a last resort for 
municipalities. States switching to unfettered Chapter 9 filing authorization 
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would in no way be precluded from offering those services that otherwise 
would be mandated through preconditions. Similarly, complete Chapter 9 
access does not preclude municipalities from first pursuing alternatives to 
bankruptcy. Examples include revenue solutions, negotiated debt 
modifications, and judicial receivers.178 Again, the key is that unfettered 
Chapter 9 access affords municipalities the discretion to choose the course of 
action that best suits their unique characteristics and financial situations. 
Direct specific authorization is also a beneficial approach in relation to the 
municipal bond market. On a micro level, the fresh start offered by Chapter 9 
bankruptcy allows municipalities to recover financially and, in the long run, 
better position themselves to both issue new bonds at relatively favorable rates 
and fulfill their corresponding debt obligations in the future. Although 
investors may be forced to accept haircuts on their bonds in bankruptcy, the 
returns could be far worse if the municipality defaulted without Chapter 9. 
Even more important, municipal bankruptcies are historically rare,179 thus 
bondholders should continue to expect full payments on their investments. On 
a macro level, the uniformity from all authorizing states providing unfettered 
Chapter 9 access should, in itself, create stability in the market. The miniscule 
risk of a municipality entering bankruptcy and then providing only partial 
returns on its bond repayments could even be incorporated into bond prices at 
issuance as a built-in insurance of sorts. In fact, a recent study found that 
municipalities in states allowing Chapter 9 access already pay a trivial 
“bankruptcy risk premium” in relation to their unauthorized counterparts.180 
While both the risk to investors and cost to issuers are relatively low, the 
chance for recovery that Chapter 9 provides to municipalities cannot be 
overstated. From a long-term perspective, this will lead to financial stability 
that benefits municipalities and bondholders alike. 
Chapter 9 is a tremendous tool for distressed municipalities with benefits 
ranging from an automatic stay to limited bankruptcy court involvement. In 
addition, many of its disadvantages are disputable. For example, although 
credit ratings may initially fall, they can just as quickly be restored after 
Chapter 9 proceedings. This was the case for Orange County, which 
“recovered from its ‘junk’ rating status in fairly short order after its 1996 
emergence from bankruptcy, eventually securing ‘AA’ status from the rating 
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agencies.”181 Any lingering public perception that bankruptcy is detrimental 
needs to change, and fortunately Chapter 9 stigma appears to be on the 
decline.182 In fact, Warren Buffett recently stated that the stigma “has probably 
been reduced” in light of the filings by Stockton and San Bernardino.183 
Finally, the predictability offered by blanket authorization cannot be 
understated. The statutes are straightforward, easy to interpret, and bring 
certainty to municipalities and investors alike. On the other hand, 
preconditions and limitations expose municipalities to the failures of the 
political process. Politicians might be hesitant to engage in a politically 
sensitive bankruptcy in spite of the best economic interests of the municipality. 
Corruption may also play a role. The time has come for states to uniformly 
grant their municipalities unfettered access to Chapter 9. 
IX.  CLOSING REMARKS 
Regardless of which authorization category is truly in the nation’s best 
interest, the current variation in approaches among states is alarming. This 
variation makes it difficult for bondholders, citizens, and even local 
governments themselves to properly understand the recovery options of 
financially distressed municipalities. Uniformity, predictability, and a stable 
municipal bond market should be principal concerns for states. 
The outcome of the Detroit case could potentially lead to drastic 
authorization changes nationwide and may ultimately modify some of this 
comment’s analysis. However, it bears repeating that the city’s situation is 
quite unique in the Chapter 9 context. As one commentator put it, “[t]here is 
really no precedent for a municipality as large, troubled, and complex as 
Detroit.”184 Regardless, the public finance industry should certainly follow the 
remainder of the case and carefully scrutinize the court’s final decisions. 
TOM D. HOFFMANN 
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